SHRO-Reports

The SHRO-Cairo Report on the
Compulsory National Service in Sudan

Introduction:

Normally, Compulsory National Service (CNS) is organized by the state to allow citizens to serve their country through conscription in the armed forces, police or any other disciplinary forces against any external attack. As such, CNS has always been accepted by the people as a noble activity that is legally designated to organize the process of conscription, terms of service, areas of training, cases of exemption, penalties imposed, and conscription administration.
In the course of time, the length and scope of CNS have been much reduced with the decline of humanity to involve in the acts of war. Many countries restricted CNS to a limited period of training, which as part of the service, should be spent in community-based activities. Conscripts are also drafted in the armed forces to serve as volunteers, on call, not as professional members of the disciplinary forces. In the case of an external attack against the country, conscripts would be motivated by both family and community to defend the land. Many states impose penalties of imprisonment and/or fine on such persons. A few states deprive the conscientious objectors of some of their civil rights.

In Sudan, CNS was not decisively adopted despite the fact that a legal code was enacted in 1971. And yet, the code has not been enforced until the advent of the existing regime in soup d'etat in June 1989. The regime increased the extent of civil war excessively on the assumption that such acts would settle fundamental problems of the country for good. This has been the first time since the break out of the civil war of Sudan in 1955 that a Sudanese government converts that war into an overall ethnic and religious venture.

The Khartoum administration has persistently announced that the Sudan is made of two homes, namely: the home of Islam and the home of war. Hence, the regime declared al-Jihad (religious war) against citizens of the south whom the regime considered as enemies of Islam and the Arabs. Many young people have thus been mobilized via intensive religious propaganda to conscript into the armed forces. It has been through the death of thousands of these youngsters that the regime made many advances in the years 1990 - 1992.

Nonetheless, the situation changed afterwards as the Sudanese political opposition defeated government forces several times in the south. New sites were militarily occupied by the opposition in eastern Sudan, which put an increasing pressure on the government. The ruling regime failed to fulfill any of its promises to develop the country or to civilize Sudanese life in Islamic terms. These failures subjected the regime to bitter criticisms by the public, including supporters of the National Islamic Front (NIF), the ruling party itself.

The measures already taken by the regime to improve the deteriorating conditions of the army included the ongoing manipulation of CNS to build a government supported Popular Defence Forces (PDF) through the armament of tribal militias in the war zones. These measures led to many genocidal atrocities against the innocent citizens who had been extrajudicially killed as suspects collaborating with opposition troops. Notwithstanding, many tribal groups arrived into agreements of peace under auspices of the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM). In the fact of all these difficulties, the government resorted to an enactment of a new code for national service in 1992 (CNS).

The CNS has been immediately enforced to conscript citizens, particularly the young ones. Even the employees of the state have been required to conscript into the armed forces in order to maintain their jobs in civil service. Many persons were compelled to to escape the country as a practical way to avoid any involvement in the civil war, in which they have no faith or desire to kill, as we in SHRO-Cairo believe.

It is because of this conscientiousness that Sudanese conscientious objectors desert the regime's military service not as act of cowardice or desertion of national duty, as the regime untruthfully announces.
Towards the end of 1997 and the beginning of the new year, the opposition has been expanding military operations by successfully occupying large areas in thousand of kilometers in the eastern, southern and western parts of the country. This forced the regime to intensify conscription campaigns to conscript citizens, particularly youngsters, to fight, without adequate training, in the war zones.

A direct result of these campaigns is that hundreds of youth lost their lives by March 1997 as reported by military leaders of the opposition troops in the eastern front. This has also been ascertained by captives of war. But the government continued to conscript randomly the young people in and outside cities, especially the national capital. This situation furthermore activated an influx of young people outside the country. In particular, Sudanese families have been strongly opposed to the craziness of the regime in escalating the civil war. Most families suffered enormous difficulties to salvage their children from the tragedy of war through the acquisition of false traveling documents and exit visas. Most recently SHRO-Cairo managed to interview many conscientious objectors who had successfully arrived at Cairo to report these events to the outside world.
With these demoralizing developments in the arena of war for the ruling regime, the head of state, Omer al-Bashir, decided to draft two million conscripts. This started with a presidential decree enforcing CNS on all students who sat for the General Certificate of Education (GCE) examinations in the year 1997.

The Aims of CNS Campaigns

The presidential decree 156 of May 1997 stipulated the conscription of all students who sat for the GCE in June/August 1997. The decree included 120,000 students who were all required to be conscripted into the armed forces in order to obtain the GCE or to apply for admission in higher institutes of education. The decree imposed a ban on travel outside the Sudan upon those who fail to comply with these requirements. Abdel Basit Sebidrat, Minister of Justice, was then appointed head of a committee to assign students to camps of military training.

In May 1997, the minister announced that the number of students required to conscript was 82,000 and that they would be trained for three months. The training would include basic weapons. The successful conscripts would be promoted to a higher level of training for 45 days in the use of arms. An other phase would then include conscription of all students in the whole country into the armed forces or in production locations, in accordance with the law.
The minister assured that those students who would be admitted in universities would have to spend 12 months in training before matriculating. The students who fail to matriculate would be conscripted for 18 months.
Surprisingly, the Sudanese authorities started to move students from the training camps to the war zone since September 1997. The spokesman of the armed forces, General Mohamed al Sanausi, announced that students would be incorporated at this particular stage into advanced training camps located in the war zones to be technically trained as full members of the armed forces, which had already received them.

The General further announced that the conscripts would be trained inside training centers that have been functioning for a long time in secured sites nearby the field of military operations. This would guarantee the implementation of a joint advanced training, according to his words.

More than five months passed away before the authorities, under immense pressure from parents of the conscripted children and others, presented General Hassan Abdel Rahman, the Ministry of Defence, before the national council of the regime in October 1997 to speak about the situation. The minister approved the decision of having students conscripts dispatched to military operations in the war zones.

The General repeated allegations of the regime that the country had been confronting an external attack from neighboring countries assisted by super powers, the same allegations used by the regime to expand civil war and to conscript citizens.
The minister mentioned before the national council that in 1991 the armed forces were able to defeat the outlaws far behind the frontier. But this time, said the General, it was different as there had been an external aggression.
SHRO-Cairo, however, believes that this so-called "external aggression" actually refers to the recent expansion of warfare in the course of the ongoing confrontation between the government and opposition troops since January 1997.
The Minister of Defence ascertained the statement already announced by General al-Sanausi, spokesman of the armed forces, by saying that students became part of the armed forces and had been sworn in to perform all tasks conferred upon them, even if they would die for it.

By so doing, it is clear that the Authority did dispatch students to the war zones against their will and without any adequate training. The Authority has deceptively abused the students and their families. Had it not been for the persistent pressures of both students and their families against the Authority, the truth would never have been pronounced the way it consequently happened.

How Did the Authority Campaign for CNS?

In antagonism to all of the traditional ways practiced in CNS, the Authority initiated a campaign in March 1997, with military groups on patrol all over the streets of Khartoum and entrances of the city, to compel students aged 18-25 to join the training centers immediately. Beginning May 1997, the local authorities of Khartoum State made a list of two million youngsters or more, and in June 1997 the campaign was shifted to some provincial cities such as al-Hasahissa, Maringan, al-Sirayha, and Kab al-Gidad.

SHRO-Cairo received the names of four students kidnapped by the authorities and included into the camps. These are Mohamed Malik Al-gizoli (17 years), Abu al-Gasim Mukhtar Ali (16 years), Mazin Abdel Wahab (17 years) and Mohamed Seifeldin Al-nagi.

It was clear that the authority was determined to conscript students into the camps by making conscription a requirement for educational attainment, employment in public service, or traveling abroad. Abdel Basit Sebidrat, head of the conscription committee into the training camps, announced in June 1997 that the campaign provides the means for the admission to universities, employment in public service, or traveling abroad for study.

He assured that applying to the universities would be in the camps, and that the conscript would be paid a monthly salary in the amount of 36,000 - 40,000 in Sudanese pounds. In the process of mounting up the campaign, the authority started lately in June 1997 to hunt down children of Sudanese emigrants abroad on arrival at Sudanese airports for annual vacation. The campaign further expanded to include all schools, mosques, and the living quarters of cities.

The real intension of the Authority in all these procedures was further revealed by the Khartoum State decision to allocate 25 million Sudanese pounds for the arrest of vagabonds and pedlars. On July the 3rd, 1997, hundreds of these persons were arrested and detained inside the premises of an abandoned movie-house. The detainees were then moved to unknown places. And yet, more than one source assured SHRO-Cairo that they had been dispatched to military camps and subsequently mobilized in the war zones.

The under-secretary of education moreover announced that results of the GCE examination would be announced at the military units, not in schools as was usually exercised by the ministry of education, except for the female students. Students failing the GCE examinations would be allowed to apply for re-examinations at their military units.

The head of the information committee for incorporation of students into the military training camps, Salah al-din al-zein, announced that the students who would not join the camps, if they had been accepted in private schools, would also be included in the camps, according to decree 156. He said that their names had already been obtained and that no student would be allowed to sit for the upcoming GCE examinations until that student would have been previously admitted to training camp.
By the second week of September 1997, Abdel Basit Sebidrat, minister of justice, responsible for student conscription follow-up, handed out the result of the GCE examinations to General Hassan Abdel Rahman, the minister of defence.

In contravention of the conscription law, the authority decided to conscript all students who sat for the GCE examinations without any exception other than the children of some state-managers and/or NIF leadership. The decree was applied on children whose ages were far less than 18 years, contrary to the legal age of conscription as is prescribed by law.

On October 6, 1997, the minister of defence announced before the national council that students less than 18 years of age, in addition to those medically unfit, would be distributed to serve in government units as they wish. The children and the sick who had been dispatched to the war zones would be demobilized.

Much before the minister's statement, in actual fact, General Ibrahim Sulieman, the armed forces chief-of-staff, had already ordered the return of the students less than 18 years of age and the sick children to their homes, beside a member of each family providing two or more students for the training camps.

These statements proved that the authority has been randomly applying the presidential decree of conscripting children into the armed forces in violation of its provisions.

Despite the announcement of the under-secretary of the education to exempt female students from knowing about the result of the GCE examination at the training camps, the female students were shocked to know that their schools could only inform them about percentage of the exam, and that they had to join the military camps if they wanted to get their GCE certificates. This clearly meant that the actual authority intended to conscript all children, males or females, to fight. At this point it is important to mention that such policy would increase -as it did- internal tensions in the whole country as Sudanese parents do not allow their female children to join the camps administered by male soldiers. Furthermore, Sudanese families have consistently protested the escalation of civil war. Still the authorities opened more training camps for female children in Al-Qutaina, Jabel Awlia, Al-Gaili, Gedaref and Kassala.

To conclude, the Sudanese authorities implemented campaigns for conscription of both male and female children into the forces not withstanding the rights of students to object against the act of war as conscientious objectors in gross violation of International Humanitarian norms, in addition the contravention committed against provisions of the law enacted by the regime itself.

The Real Causes of Conscription:

As confirmed by many reliable sources, the conscription campaigns have not included the children of state managers. For example, the sons of General Hassan Abdel Rahmsn, the minister of defence, prosecutor, General Abdel Rahman Ibrahim (whose son was allowed to leave the Sudan to join the American University in Cairo), the minister of public transport Al-Hadi Bushra, Salah Karar the minister of presidential affairs and Qotbi Mahdi an NIF leader.

Some observers noted that these exceptions indicated the real intentions of the authorities that emphasize the use of children as human shields in the war. Many students informed SHRO-Cairo that, definitely, a particular policy that had been processed to exempt children of the NIF rulers from conscription. A student who had been trained in the Qutaina camp informed that administrators of the camp dismissed 20 students known as NIF supporters from the camp as being medically unfit.

Some of these exemptions included Mohamed Idris Al- al-Sanausi, Abu Obaida Abdelalla, Mohamed Ali Mustafa, and Amru Mohamed. Also, another group was exempted from military training and assigned coordinating activities inside the camp.
By the end of 1996 and the year 1997, the government called upon the youth and students to conscript into the armed forces and the PDFs in light of the default brought about by the expansion of military operations in the south and opening of new fronts in the east and the Nuba Mountains. Based on reliable sources, in addition to the documented material exposed in this report, the government has persistently abused children as human shields in the battlefields.

As earlier mentioned, students were not adequately trained. The only weapon used in training the conscript was light machine gun, which was specifically used in the front lines of military actions.

Early in June 1997 the Authority activated the campaign to hunt down the young population. Observers attribute these practices to political aim of the government to curtail the movement of youngsters to protest the disastrous political and economic policies of the regime, as actually occurred in the national capital and other cities. The regime abused CNS the way it campaigned to force hose detention on students as potential demonstrators.

On June 7, 1997, the minister of high education, Professor Ibrahim Ahmed Omer, held a press conference as a direct result of the pressures exerted by parents upon the authorities. The minister announced that Arabic and English languages would be taught, accompanied by Islamic education, at the military camps to enable the students to continue the school year. He also announced that the opening of schools would be delayed for three months, and that the children of Sudanese emigrants abroad would be equally treated with respect to training requirements.

It is noteworthy at this point to mention that the government had been discriminating between children of emigrants and other students of the Sudan in school fees, as well as scores of admission to universities.

The Ugandan "Sunday Vision" reported that the Sudanese government dispatched 60,000 members of the armed forces to defend Juba. As many observers maintain, students did comprise a large proportion of these troops because the authorities expected a massive attack on the part of the opposition troops, irrespective of the statement issued by the minister of defence that the country was under some external attack.

The minister did admit that the student conscripts had already become part of the armed forces and that the process of conscription would continue so that the number of conscript would be five millions.

SHRO-Cairo believes that the aim of the campaign was meant to abuse students in the war zones rather than training them in accordance with law. The Sudanese authorities have been determined beyond any doubt to escalate civil war. The regime's occasional announcement for peace making in the country proved to be nothing but lies.

Opposing Conscription in the Death Camps:

The camps to which students have been transferred for training never adequately prepared. Many reports indicate that food consisted of dry bread and some badly cooked meals that were served in a very unhealthy way. This led to many cases of sickness. The drinking water, in turn, was stored in rusty and dirty pots.

Up to this very moment, most camps are located in remote areas where scorpions and snakes are largely available. Despite the fact that some physicians were present in the camps, primary health care was scarcely applied. These hazardous situations led to the death of several students in the camps.

The camps witnessed many rebellious movements on the part of students against the camp administration and commanding officers. Students have been forcibly humiliated. In one case, a student was made suffocate to death by an instructor, who forced the student's head into a barrel of water. This occurred at a training camp in Kab al-Gidad. Many reporters confirmed this murder in special; interviews with SHRO-Cairo.

In another horrible case, that took place at the Aylafoon camp in August 1997, NIF security elements and student supporters killed Bella, a student of the Ansar al-Sunna group., who was strongly critical of the conscription campaign. These crimes in addition to the unhealthy conditions of life in the camps, led to the occurrence of bloody confrontations between students and camp administrations.

With more than 1,500 conscripts, al-Markhiat camp constituted one of the biggest training camps in the country. On Sunday the 27th of July 1997 following the death of a student due to a scorpion bite and the obvious lack of primary health care, students set fire in the camp and stoned the officers. The students abandoned the camp and walked to the neighboring market, Souq Libya, in a massive demonstration against the authorities. The authorities failed to force the return of 150 students who had managed to escape from the place.

The Qutaina camp, which until July/August 1997 accommodated 1,800 students from Omdurman, witnessed similar events. Mohamed Mahmoud Omer Ali aged 17 reported the sequence of event in that camp since July 26, 1997 until he escaped to Cairo assisted by his relatives in the NIF.

This student confirmed the unhealthy conditions of the camps, the torture, and the abuse of students members of the democratic front who, in particular, continued to oppose the conscription activities of the regime to encourage students to escape from the camps, and to resist any participation in the war.

On Tuesday August 26, 1997, NIF security elements accompanied by NIF student supporters arrested Mohamed Mahmoud Omer Ali together with Amir Kamal, Mohannad Mohamed Ali and Mohamed Mirghani al-Naow. They were taken to a place inside the camp, severely tortured by beatings, fire, and threatened with extra-judicial killing unless they would inform about the activities made against the regime in the name of democratic front.

An intelligence officer, called al-Sadiq Awad al-Sadiq with some security officers and a student -whose name is Abdel Azim Kassawi- participated in the torture.

On their release on Friday August 29th, 1997, they saw an exhibition of anti-democratic statement cautioning students from joining the democratic front.

The student informed that the camp was administrated by Colonel Izz al-Din al-Naow assisted by a security lieutenant colonel.
The daily activities of the camp were usually begun at: 2:30 a.m to continue without any rest until the midnight. Activities included long distance race, standing in attention for long hours under the sun, and intensive training in the use of light machine guns, as well as other similar field weaponry.

The daily activities also included implementation of an educational program emphasizing the ideological concerns of the NIF to change the whole world. The lecturers included Abdel Sadiq al-Assad, a businessman, Hussein Ma-rouf, defence state minister, Ibrahim Sulieman, armed forces chief-of-staff, professor al-Hibir Nour al-Dayim in addition to the NIF students at the university of Khartoum Christian students were not allowed to attend lectures inside the mosque, but they were forced to attend outside the mosque where the lectures where offered.

In the beginning of August 1997, four students were diseased by snakes' bites at the Qutaina camp, which was also infected with malaria and bilharzias. Although Dr. Ameer, physician of the camp, did recommended relief of work for some cases, the commanding officers overlooked his medical advises.

As the heavy rainy weather ruined the roof of all huts in the camp, the students demonstrated on august 28th, 1997 in protest of the debilitating conditions of the camp. Some of the buildings were destroyed. But the demonstration was met with gunfire. The students called for improvement of living standards and for public freedoms. They shouted against the rule of al-Bashir and educational policies applied in the training programs of the camp.

By the end of September, only 400 students out of 1,800 conscripts were still kept in the camp. All the others managed to escape the camp through the assistance of citizens living in the neighborhood. On Sunday, September 28th, 1997, the remaining students were dispatched to the war zones in Juba. What happened in "Sowba Camp" was disclosed by 15 years student, Sami Said Bushra, before he died as a result of torture inside the camp. Sami was a student of grade 7 at Abusaid Preliminary School. He was suffering from bilharzias before he was kidnapped from one of the streets of Khartoum on 22/6/1997 while he was trying to get some medicine from Sulieman Abu Salih pharmacy. He was immediately ordered to mount on one of the Public Order Police cars and was taken with other 20 boys to Sowba area. 15 days later the total number was above 500. The students were sorted out from others (vagabonds) who were taken to other camps. According to the deceased child they were all subjected to maltreatment and tortured by flogging after stripping off their clothes, deprivation from sleeping and feeding and forcing them to perform severe exercises. Sami was able after more than one month to meet one of his neighbors named Carlo who is working as a soldier in the army. Carlo informed the family on Saturday 26/7/1997 about their son being kept in Sowba camp and the family members, who were searching for their son for the last month, started immediately preparing their documents on Sunday 27/7/1997 to prove that Sami was only 15 years preliminary school boy who is also seriously ill. On the same day in the evening Sami arrived at the house in a terrible condition, completely emaciated and only weighing 32 kilograms, wearing ragged clothes and with black eyes. He was taken to hospital where he was transfused with five pints of blood in a trial to raise his hemoglobin that was non recordable. All efforts had failed to keep him alive and he died on Tuesday 19/8/1997. Postmortem was performed and the death certificate number (520151) was issued. The postmortem confirmed that there were signs of torture all over the body especially over the chest and eyes and that his pulmonary artery was occluded by clots. Investigation of the case is carried out at Omdurman police headquarters and registered under police case number 275/97 and the legal proceedings are followed by the family, and SHRO-Cairo has a copy of the death certificate and the postmortem certificate.

Similar events occurred in the camps of Jebel Awlia, al-Haj Abdalla in Gezira, al-Silait at the eastern side of the Nile, al-Aylafoun, Karari and the Mudara-at. One of the largest camps, that of Musa'ab Ibn Omair, was largely disorganized by continious acts of rebellion and repeated escape from the camp. The tents of the camp were also destroyed by the outraged conscripts.

In reaction to the unhealthy conditions of the camps, the lack of proper training, and the fear for lives, the students called these camps "the death camps". But the authorities did not take any measures to improve these conditions.

Instead of improving these horrible conditions, the authorities issued a directive to dismiss any student who would be absent from the camp for three days. The virtually meant a complete deprivation of students from both education and employment.
On Wednesday, September 24th, 1997, a number of students brought from Shendi and Atbara area to be transferred to Juba escaped collectively from their guards at the Khartoum Airport and spread all over the residential areas of Burri nearby the airport. Although the authorities managed to capture some of these students and did force them to travel to Juba, the minister of defence announced that only 72 students actually escaped.

The increasing incidence of death and frequent cases of escape and rebellion against the authorities of the camps raised grievous concerns on the part of families and parents who discovered that the camps -announced by the regime as educational institutions to train their children- were -in fact- establishments to undertake full military preparations to kill their children in the escalated civil war all over the country.

The parents and families were by then aware of the military plans of the regime,: to transfer northerner children to fight in the south whose children would be transferred to fight in the east.

A statement issued by some Sudanese academicians announced that 44 junior students of the faculty of medicine at the Islamic University had been killed in the war in October 1997. The statement reported that 32,000 students had been killed in the battles between the government and opposition troops in the lat four years. The opposition political parties disseminated similar statements in the national capital reprimanding the regime for these war crimes.

On Tuesday, September 33, 1997 and Wednesday October the 1st a997, the parents of many students participated in massive demonstrations in al Thawra town of Omdurman and the Halfaya town. The parents demanded an immediate return of their children from the war zones because they had not been adequately trained. But the authorities continued to issue false informations about the situation until the minister of defence announced the real plans of the regime as was earlier mentioned.
The demonstrators stoned the residence of Dr. Ibrahim Ahmed Omer, the minister of education. The mothers of many students also submitted a memo, in a peaceful demonstration, protesting the conscription policies and practices to the council of ministers and the general command of the armed forces. Accusing the demonstrations of being a function of the Communist Party and the opposition groups, the authorities suppressed the women's demonstration by force.

The use of tear gas and violent beatings against other demonstrations in the al-Souq al-Shabi area and al-Ushara at Khartoum, in which a number of cars were destroyed, led to the death of al-Naima Abdel Rahman (38) on Saturday, October 11, 1997. The authorities claimed that the cause of death was a heart attack.

Disguised as military police the NIF supporters started a crazy search for the demonstrators, as well as the students who had earlier escaped the training camps.

Conscientious Objection to Military Service:

Conscientious objection to military service is a concept used to denote the case of the conscientious objectors who refuse, in principle, to carry out military operations in accordance with their own personal commitment not to involve in acts of war, as it is morally wrong to fight and kill. In its decision (40/37 - 1978) the Human Rights Commission adopted a definition of Conscientious Objection allowing a complete objection to any involvement in killing or partial objection to the aim of military action.

The principle of Conscientious Objection has been adopted by the United Nation General Assembly and the Human Rights Commission, in addition to many other conferences such as the international peace conferences (the 1st, 2nd and 3rd) and the international youth conferences. The United Nation's Charter states that the right to use the armed power is only permitted in the case of self-defence against an external attack.

These provisions have been further strengthened by the General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, resolution 2131 of 21 December 1965, and, most particularly, resolution 2625 (XXV) of 14 December 1974, which stipulates the right of all persons to reject service in military forces or police to apply policies and practices of racial discrimination. These constitute an international consensus condemning and strongly working to put an end to racial discrimination.

On the basis of these resolutions SHRO-Cairo calls for a strong international condemnation to the Khartoum regime, in addition to the need to take serious steps to force the regime to comply with the international norms.

Since the Tehran Conference of Human Rights in 1968, which issued resolution 20, the international community developed a trend to implant the values of public freedoms, human rights and human dignity among the youth of the world. Later, the resolutions of the Tehran Conference were further enforced by the Human Rights Commission, resolution 20 (D-25) of 18 March 1969, and the reference made to the issue of conscientious objection in accordance with resolution 11B (D-27) of 2nd March 1971. These resolutions were also reinforced by subsequent resolutions by the Human Rights Commission such as resolutions 38 (D-36) of March 12, 1980; 40 (D-37) of March 12, 1981; and the General Assembly resolution 37/48 of December 3rd 1982.

Article 8 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, article (8) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, and article (18) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights provide for a wide range of social rights and the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Although article 8 of the Convention on Civil and Political Rights allows any national service required by law of conscientious objectors, the article does not preclude the right of individuals to conscientious objection in any sense.

Among the fundamental rights is placed the most fundamental right, the right to life, in article 3 of the Universal Declaration, article 6 of the Convention on Political Rights, and article 4 of the African Charter. Much earlier, all monotheistic religions have emphasized the right to life in the Ten Commandments of the Turah and the Holy Quran. Naturally, the right of conscientious objectors is strongly supported by the right to life.

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, as approved by the General Assembly resolution 260 A (111) of 9 December 1948, stipulates the punishment of persons commiting genocide or any of the other crimes related to genocide, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals (article 111).
The international norms prohibit all acts of violence to violate human rights. As earlier discussed, many states have realized the right to conscientious objection. Some states have also provided alternative ways for the conscientious objectors to serve the country provided that such service would be peaceful and beneficial to the community.

In contrast, the Sudanese authorities have not complied with any of these rules, despite the fact that the code of national conscription allows alternatives to military service for the conscripts (section 2-1). True, the right to conscientious objection is not applicable to the case of military staff deserting the hardships of the military work. And yet, there are many causes to explain the reasons why students and other conscripts object to national service under the NIF rule.

On the top of these reasons is the fact that the vast majority of Sudanese people, supported by the international community, reject the ongoing war of the regime which is an internal armed conflict, not an external aggression.

Another reason is that this civil war is waged by the regime to commit a collective genocide of specific ethnic and religious groups to be replaced by certain Arab and Muslim elements.

It is ascertained beyond any doubt that the regime has been committing gross violations of human rights in the war zones. These violations included torture, extra-judicial killing, rape, enslavement, random bombardment of civil residential area, and the deprivation of needy people from food, medical drugs and humanitarian relief. All these heinous deeds incite conscientious objection.

On the other side, the Sudanese authorities have not trained the conscripts adequately before they were actually sent to fight in the war zones. Hence, it is quite acceptable that the conscripts would make every good effort to salvage their lives by abandoning the war the regime has been crazily pursuing against their own fellow citizens.

For all these reasons, SHRO-Cairo believes that the exercise of the right to conscientious objection by Sudanese students and the other young people of the country is not only acceptable, but that the international community should reinforce that exercise and should exert all possible pressure against the regime to stop the war. These suggestions must be adopted in accordance with the United Nations resolutions and the fact that the General Assembly, supported by all human rights groups, has condemned Sudan Government for six times, including this year (i.e. 1997).

SHRO-Cairo calls upon the international community to consider all the atrocities committed by the Sudan Government with respect to the ongoing civil war as a gross case of apartheid. Sudan Government must therefore be penalized to comply fully with international human rights norms and to respect the urgent need to instate democratic rule in the Sudan.

Violations of Sudan Government to the International Legitimacy and the Code of National Service

First: Escalating Civil War and Genocide Acts:

SHRO-Cairo holds that the ruling regime has been violating the United Nations Charter (articles 2,4,51). The regime has equally violated the prohibition of propaganda for war and advocacy of national, racial and religious hatred, that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility and violence according to article 20 of the International Convention of Civil and Political Rights. In addition, the regime has largely violated the following international resolutions: 2073 (D-20) of 7 December 1965, 2447 (D-23) of 19 December 1968, 33/165 of 20 December 1978, 37/48 of 3 December 1982, and resolution 33/165 of 20 December 1978 which specifically defines all cases in which the use of armed forces is illegal.

Most important, the fact that genocidal war of the regime constitutes a gross violation of the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of Genocide (approved by the General Assembly resolution 260 A111 of 9 December 1948) means that the persons charged with genocide or any acts related to it must be tried and punished whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.

Second: Oppression and Random Application of the Code of National Service:

The campaigns carried out by the regime to conscript the youth and the arbitrary arrests made from within the streets and entries of the cities constitute other gross violations to international legitimacy. The vast majority of these youngsters were never allowed to express their opinions about the war, which was certainly a confiscation of the right to conscientious objection as defined by the 1978 resolution 40/37 of the Human Rights Commission. The regime went further to subject the conscientious objectors to savage torturing as documented in this report.

The regime's conscription campaigns included random arrests of non-Sudanese citizens who were later released. Children less than 18 years of age, in addition to those medically unfit, were also released. The conscriptions of these groups, in essence, violated section 11 in chapter 2 of the CNS, which exempts individuals medically unfit from the service or assigns them some other alternatives.

The authority violated section 12 chapter 2 of the CNS by arbitrarily arresting many citizens who solely responsible for their fathers, wives, children or siblings as dependent individuals. These dependents, nonetheless, were never adequately substituted by other financial sources as stipulated by law. Some cases that had been dispatched to the war zones were later redressed, which testified to the violations committed by the authorities.

Section 12-2 of the same law allows the delay of national services or all students who would be working towards the attainment of an educational degree for the first time provided that their ages would not reach 32 years in pursuance of such attainment. The authorities never complied with these provisions as the right of parents to decide upon the education of their children (in accordance with article 18 of the International Convention of Civil and Political Rights, and article 13-3 of the International Convention of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) has been continuously violated by the regime.

The NIF political ideology is based on rejection of all these International norms. The regime believes in the absolute rights of rulers. Yassin Omer al-Immam, a notable NIF leader, addressed himself to this particular situation by saying before the National Council that, " the consent of parents to the transference of their children into the war zones is not mandatory by Islam. It is all vested in the ruler's decision".

In the light of the well-known adoption and protection of parental rights in both Islam and international norms, al-Immam's statement can only be representative of the NIF dictatorial rule.

Forcibly conscripting students and other citizens into military forces of the regime, the Authority violated section 17 of the CNS, which guarantees the right to petition. Moreover, the students were illegally prevented from the option of working in the police and/or the other disciplinary forces, units of the civil service and production locations. This option is prescribed by law and is an implication of the right to conscientious objection.

Third: Violation of the Right to Life:

SHRO-Cairo strongly believes that the Sudanese authorities have grossly violated the right to life which is the first and foremost right as taught by religious and fully guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (article 3), the International Convention of Civil and Political Rights (article 6) and article 4 of the African Charter on Human Peoples Rights.
The Sudanese authorities have, knowingly and deliberately, violated these rights for political gain. The students were never adequately trained. Hundreds of students lost their lives in battles fought in the eastern front in March 1997. By the closing week of October 1997, Abdel Basit Sebidrat, minister of justice, ascertained that the University of Khartoum alone provided 27 martyrs in a battle launched during that month around Juba. Other reports affirmed the act that tens of wounded students arrived at Khartoum of whom many were permanently handicapped.

Fourth: Violation of the Right to Education and the Right to Parental Decisiopn-making:

In a procedure unprecedented throughout the modern history of the Sudan, the Sudanese authorities conferred upon students an obligation of national service in connection with the right to education. The authorities refused to deliver educational certificates to the students at their schools. Instead, the certificates were transferred by the ministry of defence, which in turn, allowed their delivery only in the training camps.

These measures constitute a gross violation of International norms, particularly article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human rights and the International Convention of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (article 13-2g).

Instructing the conscripts in the camps through the NIF indoctrination violated article 18 (4) of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights which states that: states parties to the convention must "undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents, and when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions".

Violating the CNS, the regime deprived the students, who refused to participate in its conscription campaigns, from the right to education. This is certainly an illegal punishment since section 28 of the National Code prescribed a punishment amounting to 3 years of imprisonment and fine or with both for such objectors. But there is no additional punishment by law.

Recommendations:

The Sudan Human Rights Cairo Branch (SHRO-Cairo) calls upon all human rights organizations, concerned governments, and conscientious individuals all over the world to condemn the Sudanese regime in the strongest terms possible for the heinous crimes it has been persistently committing in violation of International Legitimacy, national laws and human rights.
SHRO-Cairo calls upon the international community to impose serious and effective penalties upon the regime until it responds fully to the following terms:-

1. The immediate stoppage of civil war, including the propaganda for war.
2. The immediate stoppage of the oppressive conscription thus far taken and the compliance, instead of such activity, with the legal procedure adopted by international norms.
3. The return of all students, who so desire, from the war zones to their homes to be able to pursue the right of education in a peaceful and normal environment.
4. The realization of the right of citizens to express views on the aims of war and to enjoy the legal exercise of the right to conscientious objection, without any intimidation or oppression.
5. The immediate stoppage and condemnation of any incitement of genocidal ideas or practices against citizens of the Sudan on the basis of the ethnic, religious or any other characteristics, as is prescribed by international norms.
6. The prosecution of all violations committed inside the camps, particularly the assassination of students and the death of others as a result of negligence or for lacking in medical care, and the trial of those involved in the torture of conscripts of whom some names are documented in this report.

Cairo, January 1998

Note: This report was prepared by the former SHRO-Cairo Secretary General Dr. Hamoada Fathelrahman and was translated by Dr. Mahgoub El-Tigani, SHRO-Cairo President.