SHRO-Cairo Reports
ETHNIC CLEANSING OF THE DARFUR MUSLIMS: THE MASSALEIT
THE MASSALEIT COMMUNITY, EGYPT
March 2000 Special to USAfricaonline.com, USAfrica
The Newspaper by Dawud Ibrahim Salih, Muhammad Adam Yahya, Abdul Hafiz
Omar Sharief and Osman Abbakorah, representatives of The Massaleit Community
in exile, Cairo, Egypt.
Despite their deep roots in Islam, and their traditional
loyalty to the Umma Party, the NIF regime considers non-Arabs to be potential
fifth-columnists in the civil war because of
their "African" identity and cultural heritage.
Consequently, the NIF regime has sought to destroy the traditional bases
of authority in these, communities and change the ethnic composition of
Western Sudan to preempt this imagined danger.
The NIF government argues that the violence in Western
Sudan in the 1990s is the result of tribal conflicts which have always
existed in the area. It is true that Western Sudan is a multiethnic region
where numerous ethnic groups live side by side. It is also true that ethnic
tensions and conflicts have periodically occurred because of competition
over resources, especially between the semi-nomadic pastoralist peoples
and sedentary farmers. However, traditionally, conflicts of this sort
were effectively mediated by traditional means. If the current violence
in Western Sudan is but the continuation of long-standing tribal conflict
in the region as the NIF argues, one would expect to find that this sort
of violence has long characterized the region. But this is not the case.
Since as far back as the colonial period, Western Sudan
has been relatively peaceful. The real reason that violence has torn apart
the lives of so many people in Western Sudan in the 1990s is that it is
NIF policy. By arming and financing local Arab paramilitary groups, the
NIF has quite intentionally created ethnic (and in fact racial) conflicts
across Western Sudan. Furthermore, the NIF has disarmed non-Arab groups
making them virtually defenseless against the well-armed government militias.
The NIF has instigated nothing short of a racial war against the non-Arab
inhabitants of Western Sudan.
The specific troubles of the Massaleit began five years
ago when the NIF government created thirty new positions (which carried
the title of emir) in the traditional administrative structure of the
Dar Massaleit area, and filled the majority of these offices with people
from Arab ethnic groups (in particular from the Umm Jallul Arabs). This
action by the government was rightly seen by many Massaleit as an attempt
to undermine the power of their community and their traditional leadership
role in the area, by raising members of minority indigenous Arab groups
above them. The Massaleit reacted angrily to this government action, and
tensions mounted between the Massaleit and local Arabs. Communal hostilities
broke out and acts of violence became common.
The government reacted to this situation by replacing
the governor of Western Darfur
Muhammad Ahmad Fadul with General Hassan Hamadein, thereby
putting the area under defacto military rule. The new governor began a
massive campaign of arrests, imprisonment, and torture targeted at prominent
members of the Massaleit community, including those with education, umdas,
shaykhs, and Massaleit members of the state council.
In the context of state repression of the Massaleit community,
the government-supported Arab militias began to attack Massaleit villages
in the area beginning in August 1995. In one of the earliest incidents,
a group of Massaleit villages known as Majmari to the east of Geneina,
the regional capital, were attacked by Arab militias. These villages were
burned to the ground and seventy five people were killed, one hundred
and seventy people were injured, and six hundred and fifty heads of cattle
were stolen. In a similar incident, Arab militias attacked the village
of Shoshta southwest of Geneina on the evening of July 5, 1996 and at
least forty five people were killed, most of whom were women and children.Similar
attacks occurred in other villages including Gadier, Kasay, Burta, Mirmta,
Kadmoli, and the villages of the Birirabt Mountains. Most of these attacks
were undertaken late at night when the village inhabitants were sleeping.
Upon reaching a village, the attackers typically began by lighting fire
to all the houses in the
village. Those villagers who managed to escape the flames
were then shot by the Arab militias as they fled their homes. Furthermore,
the timing of the majority of the attacks coincided with the agricultural
harvest. In this way, by burning the fields just before they were ready
to be harvested, or while the crop lay on the ground after first being
cut, the Arab militias destroyed the year's crop and exposed the Massaleit
farmers to starvation.
In short, the Arab militias quite systematically aimed
to destroy the Massaleit people, expose them to famine, and force them
to flee their ancestral lands. This was much more than a tribal or ethnic
conflict.
These atrocities were well planned and directed by the
Sudanese military governor of the area. In one of the worst attacks, on
the villages of Mount Junun, a number of militia members were killed by
the Massaleit. From the identity cards found on some of the dead bodies,
it was confirmed that these attacks were orchestrated by the NIF government
itself. Included among the dead was a Syrian named Mahmoud Muhammad Shaghar,
a Libyan named Fathy Abdel Salaam, an Algerian named Blunmi Hamaad, and
a number of persons from Chad and other areas of Sudan. Thus, the attacks
were not only organized by the NIF government, but members of the Muslim
Brothers themselves took part in the violence itself. In light of this,
the NIF government's claims that these events are merely tribal conflict
is sheer nonsense.
On March 26, 1997 the violence escalated when an Arab
militia attacked the Bayda area in southwestern Dar Massaleit using horses
and Toyota Landcruisers with mounted machine-guns. In the days that followed,
most of the villages of the area were destroyed including Ajibani, Andiring,
Miriamta, Timbili, Haraza, Umm Kharaba, Buyuut Thalatha, Ashaba, Sabirna,
Kasay, Shoshta, Kalkuti, and Kasia. In these attacks more than
These atrocities were well planned and directed by the
Sudanese military governor of the area. In one of the worst attacks, on
the villages of Mount Junun, a number of militia members were killed by
the Massaleit. From the identity cards found on some of the dead bodies,
it was confirmed that these attacks were orchestrated by the NIF government
itself. Included among the dead was a Syrian named Mahmoud Muhammad Shaghar,
a Libyan named Fathy Abdel Salaam, an Algerian named Blunmi Hamaad, and
a number of persons from Chad and other areas of Sudan. Thus, the attacks
were not only organized by the NIF government, but members of the Muslim
Brothers themselves took part in the violence itself. In light of this,
the NIF government's claims that these events are merely tribal conflict
is sheer nonsense.
On March 26, 1997 the violence escalated when an Arab
militia attacked the Bayda area in southwestern Dar Massaleit using horses
and Toyota Landcruisers with mounted machine-guns. In the days that followed,
most of the villages of the area were destroyed including Ajibani, Andiring,
Miriamta, Timbili, Haraza, Umm Kharaba, Buyuut Thalatha, Ashaba, Sabirna,
Kasay, Shoshta, Kalkuti, and Kasia. In these attacks more than four hundred
and forty people were killed, of which one hundred and fifty were women
and fifty were children. A large number of people were displaced and their
whereabouts is still unknown, although it appears likely that many were
enslaved by the militia members. On April 4, 1997 the commander of the
militia who was riding in the Toyota Landcruisor was killed and it was
discovered that he was a colonel in the Sudanese Armed Forces.
Later in April 1997, the same tactics and equipment were
used to attack the villages of the Asrini area east of Geneina. In the
course of five days, approximately one hundred Massaleit villages were
burned to the ground, more than five hundred people were killed, approximately
three
thousand Massaleit were displaced, and four hundred heads
of livestock were stolen. In 1998, at least four major atrocities were
carried out by the government-directed Arab militias. These occurred at
Gadier, Hashaba, Jabal, and Liberi. Approximately four hundred and thirty
Massaleit were killed, one hundred and twenty villages were burned, and
three hundred and ninety heads of livestock were looted.
Throughout this period, the Arab militias were provided
with weapons, equipment, transportation, military training, and military
logistics by the government. At the same time, the Massaleit were disarmed,
placed under curfew, restricted in their movements, subjected to mass
arrests, torture, and extra-judicial killings by the government. Furthermore,
Massaleit youths were forcibly conscripted into the Sudanese Armed Forces
and sent to Southern Sudan to fight in the "jihad" against the
Southern rebels, while Arab youths were allowed to stay in Western Sudan
to carry out further atrocities against the Massaleit elderly, women,
and children who remained in the area. The situation has only continued
to escalate and it has become clear that the intention of the NIF government
is the full ethnic cleansing of the Massaleit from their ancestral homeland
in Western Sudan.
On January 17, 1999, on the first day of the post-Ramadan
festival "Eid al-Fitr," an incident occurred that sparked a
full scale attack on the Massaleit throughout the whole area. On that
day, an elderly Massaleit farmer named Al-Hajj Ismail Ishaq Omar, from
the village of Tabariek
five kilometers from Geneina, found animals belonging
to Arab herders grazing in his fields. When he attempted to chase the
animals away, he was shot and killed by the owners of the animals. Three
Massaleit villagers quickly arrived on the scene and they were also shot.
Two were killed (the shaykh of the village Abaker and his son Ishaq Abaker)
and the other was injured (a school teacher named Ustaz Osman Sandal).
When more Massaleit farmers arrived on the scene, a large confrontation
ensued and one of the Arab herders was killed. When some of the tribal
heads from the Arab and Massaleit communities came to try to restore calm,
they also came under fire from the angry farmers and an Arab chief named
Al-Hadi Muhammad Reifa was killed.
When news of this incident reached the government, they
turned it into an opportunity to destroy the Massaleit. The Sudanese Minister
of Interior, Abdel Rahim Muhammad Hussein, announced to the media in Khartoum
that the Massaleit had assassinated all the Arab leaders in Dar Massaleit.
He also declared that the Massaleit were outlaws, opponents of the regime,
and constituted a fifth column in Western Sudan in league with the anti-government
rebels.
With the official encouragement of the NIF government
in Khartoum, and through the agency of the NIF officials in the state
of Western Darfur, the way was clear for the Arab militias to begin a
full and final assault on the Massaleit. A meeting was convened by the
Arabs of Western Sudan, Arabs from other parts of Sudan and even Arabs
from neighboring countries. War was declared on the Massaleit and the
government provided the local militias with more weapons, Toyota Landcruisers,
communication equipment, money, etc. The government also sealed off the
Dar Massaleit area and prevented Massaleit people from fleeing.
In the attacks which ensued at the end of January 1999,
military helicopters from the Sudanese military were used to support the
actions of the militias. More than two thousand Massaleit were killed
in these actions and thousands more were wounded. Tens of thousands of
Massaleit fled to Chad where there are as many as a hundred thousand Massaleit
refugees at the current time. For the Massaleit who remain in Sudan, the
campaign against them continues.
In mid-March 1999, more than a hundred Massaleit were
killed in a typical Arab militia attack. The conditions for the refugees
in Chad is desperate. Because they have received no assistance and protection
from international refugee organizations, they face high mortality and
the possibility of starvation. Perhaps most daunting for the Massaleit
refugees in Chad is the active cooperation which the Sudanese regime receives
from Chad in forcibly returning refugees whom the NIF regime considers
criminals.
In this broad category, any Massaleit leaders or potential
leaders can be taken back to Sudan to be imprisoned, tortured, and oftentimes
executed. Less than a month after the beginning of the campaign against
the Massaleit in January of this year, the governments of Chad and Sudan
concluded an agreement committing the two sides to cooperate in security
problems.
In a document signed in the Chadian capital of N'Djemina
between February 10-13, 1999 by the Sudanese foreign minister Dr. Mustafa
Osman Ismail and the Chadian foreign minister Muhammad Salih Nazief, who
happens to be a member of the same Arab ethnic group that carried out
the attacks on the Massaleit in Sudan, the two sides agreed to police
refugees, prevent the Chadian or Sudanese opposition forces from operating
in either country, and to strengthen existing extradition agreements so
that refugees who are considered criminals in their home country can be
extradited. Thus, it is clear that the Massaleit refugees in Chad can
expect no protection from the brutality of the Sudanese regime, even in
exile.
The Sudanese regime has been remarkably successful in
suppressing information about the atrocities committed against the Massaleit
in Western Sudan. For this reason, it is all the more important that the
news of this systematic and racist campaign reach the ears of the world.
This genocide must be stopped. But it will not end unless
international pressure is brought to bear on the NIF government of Sudan.
|